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People  are  typically  faster  and  more  accurate  to  detect  angry  compared  to  happy faces,  which  is  known  as
the anger  superiority  effect.  Many  cognitive  models  of  anxiety  suggest  anxiety  disorders  involve  atten-
tional  biases  towards  threat,  although  the nature  of these  biases  remains  unclear.  The  present  study
used  a  Face-in-the-Crowd  task  to  investigate  the anger  superiority  effect  in  a control  group  and  patients
diagnosed  with  either  generalized  anxiety  disorder  (GAD)  or panic  disorder  (PD).  The main  ﬁnding  was
that both  anxiety  groups  showed  an  enhanced  anger  superiority  effect  compared  to  controls,  which  iseywords:
nxiety
hreat
eneralized anxiety disorder
anic disorder
ttention bias
isual search
consistent  with  key  theories  of  anxiety.  Furthermore,  both  anxiety  groups  showed  a differential  pattern
of enhanced  bias  towards  threat  depending  on  the crowd  in  the  displays.  The different  attentional  bias
patterns  between  the  GAD  and  PD  groups  may  be related  to the  diverse  symptoms  in these disorders.
These  ﬁndings  have  implications  for the  diagnosis  and  treatment  of anxiety.
© 2011 Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY license.. Introduction
Humans sense more information in their environment than
hey can effectively process, so attention is necessary to ﬁlter
ut unnecessary information and to focus on relevant items.
any cognitive theories of anxiety propose that biases in atten-
ion play an important role in the causation and maintenance of
nxiety disorders (Beck, 1976; Eysenck, 1992; Mathews, 1990;
illiams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1988, 1997). There is
ow much evidence showing that high-trait anxious people and
atients with clinical diagnoses of anxiety display attentional
iases towards threatening information (for reviews see: Bar-Haim,
amy, Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & van Ijzendoorn, 2007;
athews & MacLeod, 2005; Mogg & Bradley, 2004).
Much of the evidence for attentional biases in high anxiety has
merged from a small number of experimental paradigms, includ-
ng the Stroop task, dot probe and Face-in-the-Crowd tests. In the
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Open access under CC BY license.modiﬁed Stroop task people have to name the colours of words
printed in different fonts, either in a list or presented one at a
time. Findings have revealed that anxious individuals show greater
interference when colour-naming threatening words compared to
neutral words (Williams, Mathews, & Macleod, 1996). This is pro-
posed to reﬂect that attention to the negative content in distracter
words interferes with performance on the central task of nam-
ing the ink colour. This effect has also been shown when words
are masked to restrict awareness (MacLeod & Rutherford, 1992;
Mogg, Bradley, Williams, & Mathews, 1993), and there is evidence
that the Stroop effect in these modiﬁed designs also predicts the
amount of later distress experienced from a disturbing life event
(MacLeod & Hagan, 1992). However, it has been argued the mecha-
nisms underlying this effect may  actually reﬂect disruption caused
by the emotional valence, rather than attentional effects (Mathews
& MacLeod, 2005). In addition, some propose that word stimuli may
be limited in anxiety research for a number of reasons (Bradley,
Mogg, White, Groom, & de Bono, 1999; Mogg & Bradley, 2004). For
example, words could represent a weaker stimulus or might have
a more indirect relationship with ‘real-world’ dangers, compared
to pictorial representations of threat. There is also a possible con-
found that anxious people may  be more familiar and experienced
with threat-related words compared to controls. Facial expressions
of emotion might represent a more potent and ecologically valid
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ype of stimuli for investigating biases towards threat in anxiety
esearch.
Other experimental methods, including the dot probe and Face-
n-the-Crowd paradigms, have utilised images of facial expressions
o investigate attentional biases in anxiety. Dot-probe paradigms
ypically involve two pictures appearing brieﬂy in a display, fol-
owed by a target probe appearing behind the location of one of
he pictures. Faster responses to a target are inferred to show that
ttention was preferentially allocated to the picture that appeared
n its location. A number of dot-probe studies have reported that
eople with high trait anxiety and those diagnosed with clini-
al anxiety show an attentional bias for threatening information,
ncluding facial expressions of emotion (Bradley et al., 1999; Mogg
 Bradley, 1999, 2002; Roy et al., 2008; Waters, Mogg, Bradley, &
ine, 2008). For example, using a dot probe paradigm, Mogg and
radley (1998) showed that people with high trait anxiety attended
ore to threatening faces presented at 500 ms  or 1250 ms  com-
ared to a control group and people with dysphoria.
Another method used to study the detection of threat
sing images of emotional expressions is the Face-in-the-Crowd
aradigm. Hansen and Hansen (1988) carried out the original study
nvolving groups of photographs showing emotional expressions
rranged in displays. Participants had to search the displays and
ecide if a discrepant face was present or not. They reported that
eople detected angry faces faster and more accurately than happy
aces, and interpreted this to illustrate a threat superiority advan-
age for angry faces compared to friendly faces. However, the study
as limited after discovery one of the photographs had a shadow
n it, which may  have affected the results (Purcell, Stewart, & Skov,
996). Further studies developed computer-drawn schematic faces
nstead of photographs, to avoid visual confounds between stimu-
us types. These versions of the Face-in-the-Crowd task have used
chematized angry, happy and neutral expression faces arranged in
isplays on a computer screen. Participants decide if all the faces in
he display are the same, or if there is one face that is different than
he rest. A number of studies with control participants have used
he Face-in-the-Crowd task with schematic faces and found that
ngry faces are detected faster and more accurately than friendly
aces, termed the anger superiority effect (Ashwin, Wheelwright,
 Baron-Cohen, 2006; Eastwood, Smilek, & Merikle, 2003; Fox,
ester, Russo, Bowles, Pichler, & Dutton, 2000; Öhman, Lundqvist,
 Esteves, 2001). These ﬁndings support ideas of an evolutionar-
ly developed threat detection module that preferentially detects
timuli in the environment that signal threat and allocates atten-
ional resources towards them (Öhman, 1986; Öhman & Mineka,
001; Öhman et al., 2001).
To date only a small number of studies have been reported
sing the Face-in-the-Crowd task with people who are high anx-
ety or diagnosed with anxiety disorders. Most of these studies
ave included people with non-clinical high anxiety or with diag-
oses speciﬁc to social anxiety. Byrne and Eysenck (1995) used this
aradigm with photographs of people expressing angry and happy
xpressions in displays and found that individuals high in subclin-
cal trait anxiety were faster in detecting angry faces compared to
ow trait-anxiety. Gilboa-Schechtman, Foa, and Amir (1999) used
 similar Face-in-the-Crowd design to Byrne and Eysenck with
hotographs and reported that people with social anxiety dis-
rder showed greater attentional biases for angry versus happy
aces compared to controls. A study by Juth, Lundqvist, Karlsson,
nd Öhman (2005) utilized the Face-in-the-Crowd paradigm with
chematic faces, instead of photographs, and found that people
ith high social anxiety showed more effective detection of angry
ompared to happy faces. Another Face-in-the-Crowd study using
chematic faces and different display sizes found that people with
ocial anxiety disorder had shallower slopes for detecting angry
aces compared to happy faces (Eastwood et al., 2005), illustratingDisorders 26 (2012) 329– 336
that angry faces capture attention more easily than happy faces in
those with social anxiety. They further reported that people diag-
nosed with PD also had a greater attentional bias towards angry
faces, comparable with the social anxiety group. A meta-analysis
by Bar-Haim et al. (2007) looked at 172 different studies measuring
bias towards threatening information in people with and with-
out high anxiety using a variety of experimental paradigms. The
authors reported a robust threat-related bias with a low to medium
effect size was evident in people who  are diagnosed with anxiety
disorders or have high sub-clinical measures of trait anxiety.
Generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) and panic disorder (PD) are
both clinically diagnosed anxiety disorders. GAD is characterized
by heightened anxiety and tension alongside difﬁculty in relaxing.
People with GAD have excessive and often irrational worry about
aspects of everyday life (APA, 1994). Their worry is characterized
by repeated negative thoughts about possible threat, which may
emerge from attempts at avoidance or coping (Borkovec & Roemer,
1995). This pervasive worry is beyond that normally experienced
in everyday life, and expresses as chronic and exaggerated anxi-
ety. Therefore, individuals with GAD tend to always be anticipating
disaster and worrying about issues such as health, money, fam-
ily, friends, and work. In contrast to the chronic low-level anxiety
found in GAD, panic disorder (PD) involves unexpected episodes
of intense fear accompanied by physical symptoms, and persistent
apprehension over their recurrence or consequences (APA, 1994).
A strong component of PD is the fear of embarrassment or humili-
ation from others. In fact, individuals often report a desire to avoid
or escape public places because they would feel embarrassed or
humiliated if they had a panic attack there. Since social elements are
an important factor, it is thought people with PD might be biased
towards cues of social evaluation, such as emotional expressions
(Eastwood et al., 2005).
While GAD and PD present with dissimilar behavioural pro-
ﬁles, the nature of any differences between PD and GAD in their
attentional biases towards threat is currently unknown. One idea
is there might be a common core threat-related attention bias
shared by the various anxiety disorders, with attentional differ-
ences between disorders emerging from other factors (Bar-Haim
et al., 2007). Alternatively, distinctive patterns of attentional biases
related to behavioural symptoms might be evident across various
anxiety disorders. While there is some initial evidence to sug-
gest various anxiety disorders might show differences in how they
process threatening information, there is a lack of experimental
ﬁndings in this area (Amir et al., 1996; Vrana, Roodman, & Beckham,
1995). Research has shown differences between anxiety disorders
in the timing of attentional biases, with some disorders showing
early biases towards threat and later biases away from threat (Mogg
& Bradley, 2004, 2006). However, Eastwood et al. (2005) reported
that social phobics and those with PD had similarly enhanced atten-
tion towards threatening faces. There have been a number of mixed
ﬁndings to date, so further research is needed to better understand
the nature of cognitive biases in anxiety disorders.
1.1. Experimental aims
The main aim of the present study was to investigate atten-
tional biases towards angry faces in control participants and clinical
patients diagnosed with either GAD or PD using the Face-in-
the-Crowd task with schematic faces. Schematic faces were used
because they are highly matched on low-level visual characteris-
tics, which minimizes potential visual confounds that can occur
between expressions in real photographs (Fox et al., 2000; Öhman
et al., 2001). We  predicted that the GAD and PD would show
enhanced anger superiority effects compared to controls. Since PD
is associated with heightened concerns about socially observed
anxiety, we  hypothesised people with PD might show even greater
xiety 
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nger superiority effects compared to those with GAD, especially
hen crowds contained emotional faces.
. Materials and methods
.1. Participants
The study was conducted in the Laboratory of Sexology and Psy-
hotherapy, at the II Department of Psychiatry, Medical University
f Warsaw. 66 volunteers were recruited to take part in the study.
articipants included 18 clinical patients (13 females) who had
eceived a diagnosis of GAD, and 17 clinical patients (15 females)
ho had received a diagnosis of PD by trained psychiatrists at the
utpatient clinic. Patients were initially referred to the clinic by a
sychiatrist based on a diagnosis of anxiety disorders according to
nternational criteria (WHO, 1992). Diagnosis of the patients was
hen conﬁrmed at the clinic using either the ofﬁcial Polish version of
he Mini-International Neuropsychiatric Interview (MINI) version
.0.0 (Masiak & Przychoda-Masiak, 2002; Sheehan et al., 1997) or
urther international criteria (APA, 1994). The selection criterion for
he patient groups in the study was a primary diagnosis of GAD or
D, with no evidence of psychosis or organic brain damage. Consen-
ual diagnosis by members of the clinical team was  a requirement
or selection to the research. In addition, 31 people with no his-
ory of psychiatric disorders (19 females) were recruited from the
ommunity to serve as controls. All participants completed ques-
ionnaire measures of state and trait anxiety, depression, worry
nd attentional control. All participants had normal or corrected-
o-normal vision, and gave written informed consent to take part.
.2. Materials
The Face-in-the-Crowd task was run on Macintosh Power PC
3 with a 15-in. LCD monitor for display. The presentation of the
xperiment and responses of the participants were controlled by
syScope (Cohen, MacWhinney, Flatt, & Provost, 1993). The face
timuli were schematic faces used with permission from previously
ublished research (Öhman et al., 2001). Each of the displays con-
ained four schematic faces arranged in a 2 × 2 matrix. Each of the
argets appeared equally in all four locations. Each face took up
.9◦ × 3.9◦ of visual angle. The closest distance from the center of
he face to the central ﬁxation point was 6.7◦ of visual angle and
he closest distance from the center of one face to another face was
.6◦ of visual angle.
.2.1. Questionnaire measures
Five self-report questionnaires were completed before partic-
pants began the computerized tasks. The Spielberger State-Trait
nxiety Inventory (STAI: Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, &
acobs, 1983) is a 40-item self-report measure of anxiety. The ﬁrst
0 items (STAI-S) measure state anxiety, or how the subject feels
ight now. The second 20 items (STAI-T) assess trait anxiety, or how
he subject generally feels. Each item is rated using a scale from 0
not at all) to 3 (very much so). The range of scores on both measures
aries from 0 to 60, with higher scores indicating greater anxiety. A
umber of studies have shown reliable psychometric properties for
he STAI (e.g. Spielberger et al., 1983). The Polish version (Parnowski
 Jernajczyk, 1977) of the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI: Beck,
ard, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961) was used to assess the
everity of depression. The BDI is a 21 item questionnaire composed
f items relating to depression symptoms, to measure the severity
f depression. It has a four-point scale for each item ranging from to 3, with scores ranging from 0 to 63. Higher scores represent
ore severe symptoms of depression. It has good internal consis-
ency, with a Cronbach’s alpha coefﬁcient in adults reported to be
round 0.85 (e.g. Ambrosini, Metz, Bianchi, Rabinovich, & Undie,Disorders 26 (2012) 329– 336 331
1991). The Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI: Beck & Steer, 1990) is a
21 item questionnaire measuring the physiological and cognitive
aspects of anxiety. It consists of descriptive statements of anxiety
symptoms which are rated on a 4-point scale, from 0 (Not at all) to 3
(Severely; I could barely stand it). The total score on the BAI ranges
from 0 and 63, and it has good internal consistency with Cronbach’s
alpha reported of .92–.94 for adults (Beck & Steer, 1990). Finally, the
short version of the Attentional Control Scale (ACS: Derryberry &
Reed, 2002) was included, which is a 20 item questionnaire mea-
suring the degree of attentional control of participants. Items are
scored on a 4-point scale from 0 (Never) to 3 (Always), with the
total score ranging from 0 to 60. Higher scores reﬂect greater levels
of attentional control. Studies have shown good internal reliabil-
ity of the ACS in adults, reporting Cronbach’s alpha of .87 (Muris,
Meesters, & Rompelberg, 2007).
2.3. Design and procedure
Participants ﬁrst completed the questionnaires at a desk in a
quiet room, followed by the experimental task. Each trial of the
visual search task began with the presentation of a crosshair for
500 ms,  which was followed by one of the displays containing
four faces for 300 ms.  This display time was chosen to limit the
number of saccades participants could make while viewing the
displays. Participants pressed a button on the response box to
indicate whether all the faces in the display were the same, or
whether there was  one that was  different from the rest. A trial
ended when the participant responded or after 2000 ms, then it
moved on to start the next trial after a 1000 ms  blank screen
ITI.
There were 96 target-present trials, where a target appeared in a
crowd of distracter faces. In half the trials, the angry and happy face
targets appeared in crowds of emotional faces, i.e. angry targets in
happy crowds and happy targets in angry crowds. In the other half
of the trials, the angry and happy face targets appeared in crowds of
neutral faces. There were 24 trials of each target–distracter combi-
nation type, creating the total of 96 target-present trials. There were
also 96 target-absent trials where all the faces were the same type
(i.e. angry, happy or neutral), with 32 trials of each display type.
This resulted in a total of 192 trials for the experiment. The order of
presentation for the different trial types was  randomized through-
out the experiment. Therefore, participants did not know before
the start of each trial which type of target–distracter combination
was going to appear.
2.4. Statistical design
The various group characteristics were compared using
independent-sample t-tests, and are reported in Table 1. The pri-
mary measures of interest were mean response latencies and
mean accuracy scores, and for the target-present trials these were
analysed using a repeated measures general linear model (GLM)
ANOVA with Target (Angry vs. Happy) and Distracter (Neutral vs.
Emotional) as the within-subject factors and Group (Controls vs.
GAD vs. PD) as the between-subject factor. Mean response latencies
and mean accuracy scores for target-absent displays were analysed
using a GLM ANOVA having Valence (Angry vs. Happy vs. Neutral)
as the within subjects factor and Group (Controls vs. GAD vs. PD)
as the between-subjects factor.The groups did not differ in terms of age or sex, however the psy-
chiatric groups differed from the controls on measures of anxiety
and depression as expected (see Table 1).
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Table 1
Mean demographic and questionnaire measures for the GAD, PD, and Control groups (standard deviations in parentheses).
Group
GAD (n = 18) PD (n = 17) Controls (n = 31) Statistics
Age 32.06 (10.2) 32.76 (9.22) 29.26 (9.20) F = .922, ns
Sex  ratio m:f  5:13 2:15 12:19 X2 = 3.9, ns
STAI-T 55.47a (9.23) 52.0b (9.30) 41.29 (9.18) F = 15.4, p < .001
STAI-S 50.08a (8.56) 44.41b (10.8) 34.81 (10.9) F = 13.5, p < .001
BDI 17.89a (7.76) 16.35b (9.06) 7.23 (5.94) F = 15.2, p < .001
BAI  22.01a (11.5) 23.18b (13.7) 7.65 (8.71) F = 15.4, p < .001
ACS  56.0a,c (8.93) 50.18 (7.21) 45.52 (11.0) F = 6.58, p < .01
Note: STAI-T = Trait scale of the State-Trait anxiety inventory; STAI-S = State scale of the State-Trait anxiety inventory; BDI = Beck Depression Inventory; BAI = Beck Anxiety
Inventory; ACS = Attention Control Scale.
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.1. Target-present displays
The measures of interest were mean response latency and accu-
acy scores, which were both analysed using a repeated measures
eneral linear model (GLM) ANOVA with Target (Angry vs. Happy)
nd Distracter (Neutral vs. Emotional) as the within-subject factors
nd Group (Controls vs. GAD vs. PD) as the between-subject factor.
.1.1. Response latencies
Results revealed there was no main effect of Group,
(2,63) = 2.07, ns,  2p = .10, showing that all groups were perform-
ng the same overall for the experiment. However there was  a main
ffect of Target, F(1,63) = 74.12, p < .001, 2p = .34, with angry targets
942.6 ms)  being detected faster than friendly targets (1034.0 ms).
here was also a main effect of Distracter, F(1,63) = 39.42, p < .001,
2
p = .53, with quicker response times when distracters were
eutral (967.1.0 ms)  compared to when they were emotional
1009.5 ms).
Importantly, there was a three-way interaction between Target,
istracter and Group, F(1,63) = 6.25, p < .01, 2p = .21. To interrogate
his interaction further, and to test our main hypothesis about an
nhanced anger superiority effect in the anxiety groups, we ﬁrst cal-
ulated ‘difference scores’ for each group by subtracting the RTs to
ngry targets from RTs to happy across both neutral and emotional
istracter conditions. We  then carried out independent sample t-
ests on the difference scores between the anxiety groups and the
ontrols to test our main hypothesis about an enhanced anger supe-
iority effect in anxiety. Results showed that the difference score
or the GAD group was signiﬁcantly greater compared to controls
hen crowds were neutral, t(47) = 2.09, p < .05, d = .63, but not when
rowds were emotional, t(47) = 0.74, ns,  d = .23. The PD group had
 signiﬁcantly greater difference score compared to controls when
rowds were emotional, t(46) = 2.01, p < .05, d = .65, but not when
rowds were neutral, t(46) = 0.23, ns,  d = .07 (see Fig. 1).
We then ran independent sample t-tests between the two
nxiety groups to test our third aim about differences in atten-
ional bias between anxiety disorders. The GAD group showed a
reater difference score than the PD group when crowds were
eutral, t(33) = 2.07, p < .05, d = .70, while the PD group showed
 greater difference score than the GAD group with emotional
rowds, t(33) = 3.17, p < .01, d = 1.07 (see Fig. 1).
.1.2. Accuracy data
The accuracy scores were analysed using an ANOVA with Tar-
et (Angry vs. Happy) and Distracter (Neutral vs. Emotional) as the
ithin-subject factors and Group (GAD vs. PD vs. Controls) as the
etween-subject factor. There was a signiﬁcant main effect of Tar-
et F(1, 63) = 75.97, p < .001, 2p = .16, with angry faces (87.2%) being
etected more accurately than happy faces (75.3%) (see Fig. 1).There was  also a signiﬁcant main effect of distracter F(1, 63) = 17.05,
p < .001, 2p = .52, showing that people were more accurate when
displays had neutral (83.1%) compared to emotional distracters
(79.4%) (see Fig. 1). There were no signiﬁcant main effects or inter-
actions involving Group (all p > .05).
3.2. Target-absent displays
3.2.1. Response latencies
The measures of interest were mean response latency and accu-
racy scores, which were both analysed using a GLM ANOVA with
Valence (Angry vs. Happy vs. Neutral) as the within-subject factor
and Group (GAD vs. PD vs. Controls) as the between-subject factor.
Results with response latencies showed there was a signiﬁcant
main effect of Valence F(2,62) = 92.66, p < .001, 2p = .76. Post hoc
pairwise comparisons showed that response times for all-neutral
displays (866.42 ms)  were less than both the all-angry displays
(1034.54 ms), and the all-happy displays (1038.54 ms), while there
was no difference between the all-angry and the all-happy dis-
plays (see Fig. 2a). There was  no main effect or interaction involving
Group (all p > .05).
3.2.2. Accuracy data
Results revealed a signiﬁcant main effect of Valence,
F(2,62) = 26.14, p < .001, 2p = .48 (see Fig. 2b). Post hoc pair-
wise comparisons showed that participants were more accurate
for the all-neutral displays (93.5%) compared to both the all-angry
displays (80.7%), and the all-happy displays (82.7%). There was  no
difference in accuracy between the all-angry and the all-happy
displays. There was no signiﬁcant main effect or interaction with
Group (all p > .05).
4. Discussion
The present study revealed that all three groups showed the
typical anger superiority effect, with faster and more accurate
detection of angry faces versus happy faces. This is consistent with
the idea of an evolutionarily developed threat evaluation system
that preferentially detects stimuli in the environment that signal
threat (Öhman, 1986; Öhman & Mineka, 2001; Öhman et al., 2001).
Responding rapidly and successfully to threat is critical for sur-
vival, so it is advantageous for threat-related information to be
processed in a highly efﬁcient manner compared to other types
of information. According to Öhman and colleagues (e.g. Öhman,
2002; Öhman & Mineka, 2001), there is an evolutionarily shaped
fear module sub served by neural circuits centred on the amygdala,
which detects and coordinates responses to threatening informa-
tion, such as angry faces. Perceiving threatening stimuli interrupts
C. Ashwin et al. / Journal of Anxiety Disorders 26 (2012) 329– 336 333
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In healthy individuals, a normal functioning threat detection
ystem would be adaptive for survival. However, differences in sen-
itivity or threshold of this threat-detection module are thought
o produce enhanced threat processing biases in anxiety disor-
ers. The main clinical ﬁnding of interest in the present study
as that both the GAD and PD groups showed an enhanced anger trials to detect angry and happy faces across emotional and neutral distracters for
superiority effect compared to the controls. This result is in line
with cognitive models of anxiety proposing a greater bias towards
threatening information in the development and maintenance of
anxiety disorders (Williams et al., 1988, 1997), and a number of
previous studies reporting attentional biases towards threatening
faces in highly anxious people using various paradigms (Bradley
et al., 1999; Gilboa-Schechtman et al., 1999; Mogg & Bradley, 1999,
2002; Roy et al., 2008; Waters et al., 2008). A meta-analysis by
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he amygdala-based fear module may  be hypersensitive in those
ith high anxiety (Öhman, 2007). Indeed neuroimaging experi-
ents have shown early and enhanced activation of the amygdala
o negative information in people with anxiety disorders com-
ared to controls (Evans, Wright, Wedig, Gold, Pollack, & Rauch,
008; Larson, Schaefer, Siegle, Jackson, Anderle, & Davidson, 2006;
chienle, Schafer, Walter, Stark, & Vaitl, 2005; Stein, Goldin, Sareen,
orrilla, & Brown, 2002).
The second main clinical ﬁnding of interest was  that the two
nxiety groups in the present study showed different patterns of
nhanced bias towards anger, depending on the type of faces in
he crowds. The PD group had a greater anger superiority effect
ompared to the other groups when targets appeared in crowds
ith emotional faces, consistent with the hypotheses. However,
he GAD group showed enhanced anger superiority versus the other
roups when the targets appeared within crowds of neutral faces.
his shows that the social context is important for determining the
ature and type of bias for different anxiety disorders. Measures
aken of anxiety and depression during the experimental session
id not differ between the anxiety groups. Therefore, the distinct
atterns of attentional biases are likely to relate to other important
actors rather than general anxiety states. These not only include
he social context of the stimuli used in the experiment, but also
ikely involve distinctions in the behavioural characteristics and
ocial-evaluative fears between these disorders. While attentional
iases are common to all anxiety disorders, the precise content of
he bias tends to be related to unique features that are signiﬁcant
o speciﬁc disorders (Craske & Waters, 2005; Williams et al., 1988,
997).
The enhanced threat detection by the GAD group occurred while
earching through crowds of neutral distracter faces for angry tar-
et faces, with no facilitation of threat detection when crowds
ontained happy distracter faces. This is consistent with ideas that
iases are most evident for GAD when comparing emotional and
eutral items within the same display (Mogg & Bradley, 1998,
999). GAD is characterized by chronic and exaggerated worry
elated to everyday events, such as work/school performance,
ealth, money, family or friends. The anxiety-related symptoms
n GAD are less intense compared to other anxiety disorders such all-angry, all-happy, and all neutral displays for the Control, GAD, and PD groups.
as PD, where people experience panic attacks involving extreme
fear (Noyes & Hoehn-Saric, 1998). In everyday life intense emo-
tional events where crowds of people with emotional expressions
are all looking towards you are not commonplace events. Instead,
people with GAD may  be more attuned to perceiving threat in
contexts more typical of everyday life with less emotional arousal
or social stress. In the present study, searching for an angry face
within a neutral crowd may  be more related to the chronic worry
about everyday life events which personiﬁes GAD. Furthermore,
there was  not an enhanced bias for GAD when searching for
angry targets amongst emotional distracters, which may  be due
to them perceiving happy faces within these crowds. Seeing happy
faces may  actually serve to alleviate worries and help reduce any
enhanced threat detection in people with GAD, and may  account
for why the enhancement of threat detection in GAD was only
seen within the neutral distracter crowds. Therefore, the social-
evaluative fears in people with GAD may  be more tuned to seeing
threat within neutral-related contexts, more akin to everyday life
events.
The opposite pattern of bias ﬁndings was  seen in the PD group.
They showed enhanced threat detection while searching for angry
targets within crowds of happy faces, but no enhancement when
searching neutral crowds. PD involves sudden and intense anxiety
states more closely linked to bodily sensations and their contexts,
and the fear of evaluation about these bodily sensations. The social-
evaluative fears in this disorder may  be more associated with
crowds featuring all emotional faces looking towards them, as these
have higher emotional intensity and greater potential signs of social
evaluation compared to neutral crowd displays. On  the other hand,
the reduced emotional intensity in the displays containing neutral
face crowds may  actually help to alleviate anxiety to some degree
in those with PD, as these contain fewer emotional expressions
and, therefore, potential signs of social evaluation. Panic attacks
are usually related to trigger factors which are social-emotional in
nature, while the increase of anxiety in GAD is more likely to occur
in situations of decreased stimulation, passivity, and decreases in
goal-oriented activity. There is some evidence to support this idea
from a study looking at physiological reactivity in people with GAD
versus PD in the form of respiration measures (Wilhelm, Trabert, &
Roth, 2001). They found the two disorders could be differentiated
from each other based on their physiological behaviour, in terms
of respiration in response to emotional stimuli. More speciﬁcally,
the PD group showed greater physiological reactivity compared to
GAD. This provides a ‘bottom-up’ interpretation of the disparity in
attentional biases between GAD versus PD, involving differences
in physiological reactivity that may  be inﬂuenced by the affective
intensity of stimuli.
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Another possible explanation for the bias differences is a more
top-down’ inﬂuence of attentional control. All the groups in the
resent study differed from each other on their ACS scores, with
he control group scoring the lowest compared to the two  anxiety
roups, and the GAD group having higher attentional control than
he PD group. The ACS is proposed to measure top-down mech-
nisms controlling attentional resources, with higher attentional
ontrol relating to voluntary coping strategies when processing
nformation perceived as threatening (Derryberry & Reed, 2002).
ttentional control is thought to help regulate emotional responses
nd anxiety. Therefore, these ﬁndings may  suggest differences
etween the anxiety groups in higher level voluntary control of the
ttentional processing of threat within different contexts. Inter-
stingly, cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT) of GAD focuses on
estructuring dysfunctional beliefs and meta-beliefs, while CBT of
D focuses more on the learning of relaxation, the recognition of
rigger factors, and the mechanisms underlying the exaggeration
f threatening experiences. Therefore, the CBT for GAD focuses
n mental processes, while for PD it focuses on emotional reac-
ions related with bodily experiences and their social consequences
Wells, 1997).
Our ﬁndings cannot be accounted for by a speed-accuracy trade-
ff in responding to angry faces, where people might be faster but
lso making more errors. Instead, participants in the study were
ot only faster in responding to angry compared to happy faces,
ut they were also more accurate in their detection of angry faces.
his runs counter to the idea of a speed-accuracy trade-off. Another
ossible explanation for the results is that people in the anxiety
roups were not actually faster in detecting the angry face targets,
ut instead might have been faster in scanning through the dis-
racter crowds of happy expressions when searching for angry face
argets within displays. However, differences between the groups
n scanning the distracter crowds does not help explain the results,
s no group differences in response latencies or accuracy were
ound for responding to crowds of happy versus angry faces when
o targets were present. This suggests they were equally fast in
canning through both happy and angry crowds when detecting
he targets. The present ﬁndings also cannot be explained by dif-
erences in detecting low-level visual characteristics in the faces,
uch as curved or angled lines in the stimuli (Treisman, 1980).
he angry and happy schematic faces were very highly matched
o each other on all visual characteristics, which was why they
ere chosen as stimuli. The only difference between the angry and
appy faces was the orientation of key features which produced
he corresponding emotional expressions. Therefore, we  feel the
est explanation for the present ﬁndings is an enhanced attentional
ias towards threatening information in clinical anxiety, consistent
ith previous experimental results and key theories.
The present ﬁndings have potential implications for the assess-
ent and treatment of anxiety disorders. Diagnostic differentiation
etween different anxiety disorders can be difﬁcult when it is based
olely on clinical interviews. Therefore, experimental paradigms
uch as the Face-in-the-Crowd task could be used to help aid in
ore accurate diagnosis by objectively revealing abnormal biases
owards threatening information in patients, as well as the nature
f the bias. Running the experimental task before and after treat-
ent could also help to reveal the effectiveness of interventions,
or example by showing whether treatment has been successful in
educing the bias towards threat. Of course this application would
equire high reliability and speciﬁcity of the task to consistently
how enhanced biases in people with anxiety, and also for reveal-
ng different patterns of biases between various anxiety disorders.
he present study generally had medium effect sizes for differ-
nces between groups; however more research is needed to test the
eliability and consistency of ﬁndings across many clinical studies.
imilar experimental paradigms could also potentially be used toDisorders 26 (2012) 329– 336 335
help reduce enhanced attentional biases in those with high anxiety.
Fox, Ashwin, Zougkou, and Broadhurst (submitted) recently used a
dot probe paradigm with people who  were high or low in spider
phobia, and manipulated the location of the target to always be
away from spider pictures for those high in spider fear. They found
that after many experimental trials there was a reduced atten-
tional bias towards spiders in those with high spider phobia, and
the reduction in bias was also accompanied by less aversive rat-
ings of spider-related photos. There is growing evidence that such
attentional training, or cognitive bias modiﬁcation procedures, can
alleviate anxious symptomatology in a variety of anxiety disorders
(for reviews see Browning, Holmes, & Harmer, 2010; Hakamata
et al., 2010; MacLeod, Koster & Fox, 2009), including GAD (Amir,
Beard, Burns, & Bomyea, 2009) These potential clinical applica-
tions of cognitive experimental paradigms are important because
although CBT treatments are reported to be effective for many peo-
ple diagnosed with anxiety disorders (Butler, Chapman, Forman, &
Beck, 2006), as many as one third of patients do not receive sig-
niﬁcant treatment beneﬁts and few patients actually achieve full
recovery (Ballenger, 1999).
While the simplicity of the experimental paradigm makes it
well-suited for psychiatric research, one limitation of the present
study is that the display sizes were always the same throughout.
This was  due to time constraints with the availability of the anx-
iety participants during testing sessions. Having different display
sizes would have allowed for the analysis of detection slopes for
the angry and happy targets across the different sizes for each
group (Eastwood et al., 2005; Frischen, Eastwood, & Smilek, 2008).
This additional factor would have helped to reveal more speciﬁcity
about whether pre or post attentional mechanisms were involved
in the present ﬁndings. Therefore, at present we cannot determine
whether enhanced effects by GAD and PD groups were due to bet-
ter awareness of the emotional targets or due to response biases
once the targets were detected. We  have been cautious in our
interpretations regarding the biases involved and not speculated
about whether the effects involved pre or post attentive processes.
Further studies of this type in anxiety disorders should include dif-
ferent size displays, to help determine more speciﬁcally the type
of attentional mechanisms involved. Further research should also
include greater numbers of clinical patients, as the participant num-
bers in the present study were limited.
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